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The positive effect of board gender composition on dividends remains when we employ pro-
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Most of the ﬁnance literature that studies gender issues focuses on the effects of female board directors on ﬁrm value, perfor-
mance (see e.g. Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Dezso and Ross, 2012; Matsa and Miller, 2013) and risk taking (see e.g. Faccio et al.,
2016). Nevertheless, there is an emerging literature which studies the impact of female directors and managers on speciﬁc cor-
porate decisions. This literature tends to concur that female directors and managers have a signiﬁcant impact on these decisions.
For example, ﬁrms with female directors tend to focus more on corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Shaukat et al., 2016). They
are also more likely to hire female top executives (Matsa and Miller, 2011) but less likely to downsize the workforce (Matsa and
Miller, 2013). Further, they are less likely to make acquisition bids and tend to make acquisitions with lower bid premiums (Levi
et al., 2014). Firms with female directors however spend more on research and development (R&D) (Miller and Triana, 2009).
They also take out less debt and more generally make less risky ﬁnancing and investment choices (Faccio et al., 2016). Finally,
ﬁrms with female directors also differ in terms of the incentives of insider directors as reﬂected by greater pay-performance sen-
sitivity as well as greater CEO turnover-performance sensitivity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009).
There is also evidence that female directors tend to change the boardroom dynamics. For example, female directors tend to be
less conformist and they are also more vocal than their male counterparts (Carter et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adams
et al., 2011). Further, the quality of boardroom discussions of complex decision problems is improved by the presence of female
directors as the latter bring in different and sometimes conﬂicting points of view, thereby improving the information set available
to the board (Miller and Triana, 2009; Gul et al., 2011). In other words, boards with female directors engage in more competitive
interactions; and decision making is therefore less likely to suffer from groupthink (Chen et al., 2016; Janis, 1983). Importantly,ants at the 2016 Cardiff Empirical Finance Group Conference, the launch of the Cardiff Corporate Governance
ollege Dublin, Swansea University, Surrey Business School, and Birmingham Business School.
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87J. Chen et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 43 (2017) 86–105Adams and Ferreira (2009) ﬁnd that female directors are more likely to engage in monitoring. Not only are they more likely to
attend board meetings than their male counterparts,1 but they are also more likely to sit on the auditing, nomination and corpo-
rate governance committees, i.e., the monitoring-related board committees. Hence, there is mounting evidence that female direc-
tors focus more on monitoring than their male counterparts.
In turn, dividend policy has been argued to be a corporate governance device, and more speciﬁcally a means to mitigate
Jensen's (1986) free cash ﬂow problem. Rozeff (1982) is the ﬁrst attempt at formalizing the corporate governance role of divi-
dends. He argues that dividends reduce the free cash within the ﬁrm, thereby reducing the agency costs. However, dividends
also increase transaction costs as they make the ﬁrm more reliant on expensive, external ﬁnancing. Hence, there is an optimal
dividend payout, which minimizes the sum of the agency costs and transaction costs. Similarly, Easterbrook (1984) argues that
dividends fulﬁll a corporate governance role. In line with Rozeff (1982), he argues that a high dividend payout reduces the free
cash ﬂow available to managers. It is then the ensuing ﬁrm's reliance on external ﬁnancing, which acts as a corporate governance
device. More precisely, each time the ﬁrm returns to the capital markets to raise further funding, it subjects itself to the scrutiny
of the market, including ﬁnancial analysts, the press and institutional investors.
Linking the emerging evidence on the greater focus of female directors on monitoring to the corporate governance role of divi-
dends, we hypothesize ceteris paribus that ﬁrms with (more) female directors have greater dividend payouts and that high dividend
payouts are used as a monitoring device. We ﬁnd strong support for this hypothesis for a sample of 1691 ﬁrms for the period of 1997–
2011, amounting to 12,050 ﬁrm-year observations. We ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between board gender
composition and the level of dividend payout. Speciﬁcally, the coefﬁcient estimate for our main variable of interest in the baseline
model suggests that an increase of 10 percentage points in the fraction of female directors is associated with a 1.67 percentage
point increase in the ﬁrm's dividend payout (the average dividend payout for the sample is 22.9%). This ﬁnding is robust to alternative
econometric speciﬁcations, and measures of dividend payouts as well as an alternative measure of female board representation.
A methodological challenge for our study is the possibility that an omitted variable drives the effect of board gender composition
on dividend payouts, thereby biasing our results. For instance, managers that are more responsive to investor demands for higher
dividends may also be more responsive to calls for greater board diversity, rendering our results spurious. We use three identiﬁcation
strategies to address this concern and help establish causality. First, we apply propensity score matching to identify control ﬁrms
without female directors, which are otherwise indistinguishable from our sample ﬁrms with female directors. The results suggest
that there is a signiﬁcant difference in dividend payouts between the two groups. Firms with female directors have signiﬁcantly
higher dividend payouts than the matched control group without female directors. This conﬁrms our baseline results.
Our second identiﬁcation strategy is to employ the instrumental variable (IV) approach and to use two-stage least squares (2SLS)
regression analysis. We use two instrumental variables as a source of exogenous variation in the fraction of female directors on the
board. Our ﬁrst instrument, i.e., Fraction of male directors linked to female directors, which is also used in Adams and Ferreira (2009)
and Levi et al. (2014), is deﬁned as the fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards with at least one female di-
rector. The more connected a ﬁrm's male directors are to women, the more female directors should be expected on the ﬁrm's board,
suggesting a positive relation between this instrumental variable and the fraction of female directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009).
Our second instrument is Female-to-male participation ratio, which is constructed as the female labor force participation rate di-
vided by the male labor force participation rate in a given state. The rationale behind this instrument is that ﬁrms in states where the
female-to-male participation ratio is higher are more likely to ﬁnd good female candidates for their directorships as they are able to
tap into broader talent pools. Thus, the greater the female-to-male participation ratio, the greater should be the fraction of female
directors on the board. Yet little evidence, if any, suggests that a ﬁrm's dividend payouts are correlated with the female-to-male par-
ticipation ratio of that state. As expected, we ﬁnd that both instruments are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the fraction of
female directors. The validity of the instruments is conﬁrmed via the Cragg-Donald's Wald F weak-instrument test statistic. Impor-
tantly, the 2SLS results conﬁrm the positive impact of board gender composition on dividend payouts.
Finally, we employ a difference-in-differences analysis and examine the changes in the dividend payout around female director
appointments (the treatment group), compared with the changes in a matched sample of male director appointments (the con-
trol group). Matched ﬁrms are identiﬁed based on the propensity score method. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms' dividend payouts are substan-
tially higher for the year after a female director appointment than they are after a male director appointment. Overall, our
identiﬁcation tests suggest that female directors have a positive causal effect on dividend payouts.
In further analysis, we investigate whether a ﬁrm's governance affects the relationship between board gender composition and
dividend payouts. We split the sample into strong and weak governance ﬁrms according to the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment
index, CEO duality, CEO tenure, board independence, and product market competition. In addition, we split ﬁrms according to wheth-
er they operate in technology or non-technology industries. For the latter we expect the corporate governance role of the board of
directors to be more important whereas for the former we expect the advisory role to be more important.2 We also expect insider
directors of non-technology ﬁrms to be more entrenched than those of technology ﬁrms (Anderson et al., 2000; Ittner et al., 2003).
Hence, the effect of female directors on the dividend payout should be greater for non-technology ﬁrms than for technology ﬁrms.
The results show a positive effect of female directors on dividends and this effect is highly signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) in ﬁrms with
weak governance (high corporate governance needs), but insigniﬁcant in ﬁrms with strong governance (low corporate governance
needs). These ﬁndings provide support for our hypothesis that, compared to their male counterparts, female directors are more likely
to use high dividend payouts as a monitoring device in weak governance ﬁrms as well as ﬁrms with high governance needs.1 Adams and Ferreira (2009) also ﬁnd that the attendance of male directors improves in ﬁrms with female directors.
2 See De Andrés and Rodríguez (2011). See also Chahine and Goergen (2013).
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dividends following their omission. To the extent that a dividend initiation/reinitiation reduces agency costs of managerial expro-
priation or overinvestment (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986), we expect that ﬁrms with more gender-diverse
boards are more likely to initiate dividends as well as reinitiate dividends after an omission. Our ﬁndings using a Cox (1972) pro-
portional hazard model are consistent with this prediction.
This paper makes two major contributions. Its main contribution is to the literature on board gender diversity as we provide
strong evidence of a positive effect of female directors on dividend payouts. Our paper also makes a major contribution to the
relatively sparse but growing research that links gender diversity to monitoring intensity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al.,
2011). We ﬁnd that boards with female directors are tougher monitors than all-male boards as reﬂected by the use of high div-
idend payouts as a monitoring device in ﬁrms with weak governance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources, sample selection, model speciﬁcation,
and summary statistics. Section 3 discusses the main results, robustness tests, and endogeneity issues. Section 4 examines wheth-
er the relationship between board gender composition and dividend payout is affected by various governance mechanisms as well
as a measure for governance needs. Section 5 examines whether ﬁrms with female directors are more likely to initiate dividends
and reinitiate dividends after an omission. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data sources, sample selection and methodology
2.1. Data sources and sample selection
Our sample is compiled from several sources. Director-level data is obtained from RiskMetrics, which provides director proﬁles
for S&P 1500 companies including director name, age, title, gender, the year when the director began service, and committee
membership, among others. Our period of study is 1997–2011. Data on dividends and other ﬁrm characteristics is from
Compustat. Data on CEO characteristics is sourced from ExecuComp. Financial ﬁrms (SIC codes 6000–6999) are excluded. The
ﬁnal sample consists of 1691 ﬁrms or 12,050 ﬁrm-year observations for the period 1997–2011. All explanatory variables are
lagged by one year to mitigate endogeneity concerns.
2.2. Empirical speciﬁcation
Toexamine the impact of boardgender compositionon thedividendpayout,weestimate the followingbaseline empiricalmodel:3 The
have. Of
superm
have ag
sions thDividend payouti;tþ1 ¼ α þ β  Fraction of female directorsi;t þ γZi;t þ Industryi þ Yeart þ εi;t ð1ÞThe dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio, deﬁned as dividends over net income. The ﬁndings are robust to alternative
measures of dividend payout, including dividends over total assets, dividends per share, dividends over sales, and the dividend
yield, i.e. the ratio of dividends per share to the ﬁscal year-end stock price. The main variable of interest is the fraction of female
directors on the board. Z is a vector of control variables that affect a ﬁrm's dividend payout as evidenced by the extant literature.
We shall specify Z below. Industryi represents industry-ﬁxed effects based on the Fama and French 49-industry classiﬁcation and
Yeart captures the year-ﬁxed effects.
Z includes controls that account for the impact of ﬁrm characteristics on the dividend payout, following Leary and Michaely
(2011) and Harford et al. (2008). Ln (TA) is ﬁrm size as measured by the natural logarithm of deﬂated total assets in 2009 dollars.
Leverage is deﬁned as the ratio of total debt (short- and long-term debt) to total assets. Tobin's q, a proxy for growth opportunities,
is the ratio of book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to the book value of assets. Cash/net
assets measures cash reserves and is deﬁned as cash and marketable securities divided by net assets (total assets minus cash
and marketable securities). ROA, return on assets, is a measure for proﬁtability. It is computed as earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. Return volatility, a proxy for business conditions, is measured as
the standard deviation of the return on assets over the past ﬁve years. PPE/TA, a proxy for asset tangibility, is the ratio of net prop-
erty, plant and equipment to total assets. R&D/Sales, i.e., the ratio of R&D to sales, is used as a proxy for ﬁnancial distress costs. To
mitigate the potential effects of outliers, all the above variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Hu and Kumar (2004) show that managerial entrenchment matters for dividend payouts. Thus, we include a variety of CEO-
speciﬁc and board-related variables to capture the CEO's power and the quality of corporate governance. Board size is the number
of directors on the board. Fraction of independent directors is measured as the number of independent directors divided by board
size. CEO Chairman is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. CEO tenure is
deﬁned as the number of years the CEO has been in position. E index is the entrenchment index (E index) introduced by Bebchuk
et al. (2009).3 In additional tests, we include CEO ownership as an explanatory variable.
The table in Appendix A lists all the variables used in this study as well as specifying their deﬁnitions and data sources.E index is based on the six provisions that set constitutional limits on shareholder voting power and strengthen the protection against takeovers that managers
the six provisions, four set constitutional limits on shareholder voting power. They include: staggered boards, limits to shareholder amendments of the bylaws,
ajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments. The two other provisions strengthen the protection that managers
ainst takeovers and they are poison pills and golden parachute arrangements. Each company is given a score, from 0 to 6, based on the number of these provi-
at it has in a given year. The higher the index value the more entrenched managers are likely to be in the company (Bebchuk et al., 2009).
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on board gender composition and dividend paying ﬁrms. In more detail, it shows the
number and percentage of ﬁrm-year observations with female directors as well as the number and percentage of ﬁrm-year obser-
vations with more than one female director. It also shows the number and percentage of ﬁrm-year observations with female in-
dependent directors and those of ﬁrm-year observations with female insider directors. Finally, the table also reports the number
and percentage of ﬁrm-year observations associated with a dividend payment.
Panel A, which reports the numbers and percentages by year, shows that about two thirds of ﬁrms have female directors and
this proportion is remarkably stable over time. In contrast, the percentage of ﬁrms with more than one female director increases
steadily over the period of study, from just above 24% of ﬁrms in 1997 to slightly below 35% of ﬁrms in 2011. While the percent-
age of ﬁrms with female insider directors increases over time from about 5% in 1998 to 6% in 2011, it is important to highlight
that the vast majority of female directors are independent directors and that the percentage of ﬁrms with female independent
directors also increases over time from 62% in 1997 to 68% in 2011. This is in line with Adams and Ferreira (2009). Finally, similar
to the trends reported by Fama and French (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2004) there is a steady decrease in the percentage of
dividend payers until about 2008. In 1997 dividend payers made up 79% of the sample ﬁrms whereas in 2008 this percentage had
fallen to 54. In 2011, the percentage was up again with 63%.
Panel B shows the distribution of the ﬁrm-year observations across the 11 Fama-French industries (ﬁnancial ﬁrms, forming the
twelfth industry, are excluded).4 There are marked differences across industries in terms of the percentage of ﬁrm-year observa-
tions with female directors. The percentage ranges from a low of 48.3% in Business Equipment to a high of 91% in Utilities. Busi-
ness Equipment also has the lowest percentage of ﬁrm-year observations with more than one female director whereas Non
Durables has the highest such percentage. There is also variation across industries in terms of the percentage of ﬁrm-year obser-
vations with female independent directors (ranging from 45.3% for Business Equipment to 88.4% for Utilities). More interestingly,
there are only two industries – Non Durables and Telecom – for which the percentage of ﬁrm-year observations with female in-
sider directors exceeds 10% (i.e., 10.9% and 13.6%, respectively). Finally, the two industries with the lowest percentages of ﬁrm-
year observations with a dividend payment are Business Equipment (30.1%) and Healthcare (35.5%).
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables used in this study. The left-hand side of the table
presents a comparison of ﬁrm-year observations with female directors and those without. There are consistently signiﬁcant differ-
ences (all at the 1% level) between the two groups. In a nutshell, ﬁrm-year observations with female directors are associated with
signiﬁcantly higher dividend payouts. This is the case for all ﬁve measures of dividend payout, i.e., dividends over total assets, the
dividend yield, the dividends per share, dividends over net income, and dividends over sales. Firms with female directors tend to
be more mature ﬁrms as reﬂected by greater leverage, lower R&D over sales, lower return volatility and greater total assets value.
In contrast, the picture is somewhat mixed when it comes to the corporate governance characteristics. While ﬁrms with fe-
male directors tend to have a greater fraction of independent directors (74% versus 66%), they are also more likely to have duality
of the CEO and chairman (66% versus 54%) and a higher entrenchment index (2.690 versus 2.339). Firms with female directors
also tend to have larger boards, with on average 10 members compared to roughly 8 for ﬁrms without female directors. Converse-
ly, they tend to have smaller cash reserves (as measured by cash over total assets).
A distinction is also made between dividend payers and non-payers on the right-hand side of the table. Overall, ﬁrms with dividend
payments display ﬁrm and governance characteristics similar to those with female directors. For instance, analogous to ﬁrms with female
directors, ﬁrms that pay dividends also tend to bemoremature ﬁrms, and have higher leverage, lower R&D expenditures, less growth op-
portunities, lower return volatility, and greater tangible and total assets. In terms of the governance variables, dividend-payingﬁrmshave a
greater fraction of independent directors, a higher entrenchment index, a larger board, and a higher incidence of CEO duality, but lower
cash reserves relative to non-dividend-paying ﬁrms. Importantly, dividend payers have a greater fraction of female directors (12% versus
7.6%), especially female independent directors (10.9% versus 6.7%). The difference in the fraction of male independent directors (i.e., the
number of male independent directors divided by the total number of independent directors on the board), however, is insigniﬁcant.3. Board gender composition and dividend payout
3.1. Gender and dividend payout
Table 3 contains the results for the regressions explaining the dividend payout, as measured by dividends over net income. The six re-
gressions not only vary in terms of how the fraction of female directors is measured, but also in terms of the control variables that are in-
cluded. We start the analysis by regressing the dividend payout on the fraction of female directors, as well as industry and year dummies
(regression (1)). In addition to the former variables, regressions (2) to (6) include various control variables. Regression (2) includes the
ﬁrm characteristics as control variables. In addition to these, regression (3) includes the corporate governance variables (board size, the
fraction of independent directors, the CEO Chairman indicator variable, CEO tenure, and the E index). Regression (6) also includes CEO
ownership. Regressions (4) and (5) include the same control variables as regression (3), but use different measures for female represen-
tation on the board of directors. More speciﬁcally, regression (4) uses theweighted fraction of female directorswith theweights being the
tenure of each female director relative to the total board tenure, whereas regression (5) distinguishes between the fraction of female4 The reader should note that in the regression analysis we use the 49 (effectively 45) Fama-French industries.
Table 1
Sample details by year and industry.
Our ﬁnal sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 12,050 ﬁrm-year observations for 1691 non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, which are in the intersection of the RiskMetrics, Compustat,
and ExecuComp databases. This table describes the distribution of female directors and dividend policy across years (Panel A) and industries (Panel B). Panel A shows the
number and proportion of ﬁrmswhich have at least one female director, more than one female director, at least one female independent director, at least one female insider
director, and paying dividends in each year. Panel B describes the same information as Panel A but across the Fama-French 12 industries (ﬁnancial ﬁrms being excluded).
Panel A: By year
Year
No. of
obs.
No. of
ﬁrm-year obs.
with female
directors %
No. of ﬁrm-year
obs. with more than
one female
directors %
No. of ﬁrm-year
obs. with female
independent
directors %
No. of ﬁrm-year
obs. with female
insider directors %
No. of
ﬁrm-year
obs. with
dividends %
1997 541 372 68.8% 132 24.4% 334 61.7% 25 4.6% 426 78.7%
1998 761 413 54.3% 132 17.3% 375 49.3% 23 3.0% 476 62.5%
1999 713 441 61.9% 162 22.7% 401 56.2% 28 3.9% 445 62.4%
2000 751 469 62.5% 167 22.2% 423 56.3% 35 4.7% 442 58.9%
2001 701 452 64.5% 164 23.4% 417 59.5% 35 5.0% 420 59.9%
2002 815 508 62.3% 187 22.9% 465 57.1% 46 5.6% 438 53.7%
2003 799 518 64.8% 197 24.7% 491 61.5% 39 4.9% 482 60.3%
2004 832 552 66.3% 216 26.0% 525 63.1% 36 4.3% 492 59.1%
2005 793 562 70.9% 232 29.3% 534 67.3% 36 4.5% 486 61.3%
2006 682 464 68.0% 205 30.1% 438 64.2% 29 4.3% 410 60.1%
2007 835 562 67.3% 235 28.1% 537 64.3% 44 5.3% 475 56.9%
2008 937 646 68.9% 298 31.8% 622 66.4% 53 5.7% 502 53.6%
2009 948 651 68.7% 305 32.2% 621 65.5% 53 5.6% 533 56.2%
2010 939 650 69.2% 315 33.5% 624 66.5% 60 6.4% 550 58.6%
2011 1003 709 70.7% 349 34.8% 682 68.0% 59 5.9% 627 62.5%
Total 12,050 7969 66.1% 3296 27.4% 7489 62.1% 601 5.0% 7204 59.8%
Panel B: By Fama-French 12-industry
Industry
No. of
obs.
No. of
ﬁrm-year obs.
with female
directors %
No. of ﬁrm-year
obs. with more than
one female
directors %
No. of ﬁrm-year
obs. with female
independent
directors %
No. of ﬁrm-year
obs. with female
insider directors %
No. of
ﬁrm-year
obs. with
dividends %
Non Durables 877 702 80.0% 452 51.5% 660 75.3% 96 10.9% 676 77.1%
Durables 351 225 64.1% 66 18.8% 212 60.4% 6 1.7% 258 73.5%
Manufacturing 1912 1164 60.9% 345 18.0% 1099 57.5% 59 3.1% 1423 74.4%
Energy 654 347 53.1% 102 15.6% 324 49.5% 7 1.1% 436 66.7%
Chemicals 529 431 81.5% 212 40.1% 417 78.8% 24 4.5% 466 88.1%
Business Eq. 2323 1123 48.3% 316 13.6% 1052 45.3% 72 3.1% 700 30.1%
Telecom 191 153 80.1% 93 48.7% 140 73.3% 26 13.6% 133 69.6%
Utilities 992 903 91.0% 490 49.4% 877 88.4% 25 2.5% 941 94.9%
Shops 1615 1193 73.9% 579 35.9% 1124 69.6% 159 9.8% 934 57.8%
Healthcare 1072 730 68.1% 270 25.2% 667 62.2% 64 6.0% 381 35.5%
Other 1534 998 65.1% 371 24.2% 917 59.8% 63 4.1% 856 55.8%
Total 12,050 7969 66.1% 3296 27.4% 7489 62.1% 601 5.0% 7204 59.8%
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as an additional control variable.
In all the above speciﬁcations, the coefﬁcient on Fraction of female directors is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level or
better. In terms of economic signiﬁcance, the coefﬁcient in regression (3) suggests that an increase of 10 percentage points in the frac-
tion of female directors is associated with a 1.67 percentage-point increase in the ﬁrm's dividend payout. Importantly as regression (5)
suggests, the effect of female directors on the dividend payout is driven primarily by female independent directors, as opposed to in-
sider directors, and female independent directors have a greater impact on the dividend payout than do male independent directors.5
As stated above, regression (4) uses the tenure weighted measure, which allows for the possibility that directors with longer
tenure (whether male or female) have a greater impact on dividend policy than directors with shorter tenure (Schwartz-Ziv and
Weisbach, 2013). It could also be the case that the longer-tenured male directors appoint the female directors, which would likely
reduce the impact of the latter on the dividend payout. Nevertheless, the tenure weighted measure conﬁrms our previous results:
a greater fraction of female directors results in a higher dividend payout and this positive effect is due to female independent di-
rectors rather than female insider directors (see regression (5)).6
Overall, there is strong and consistent evidence across all six regressions that the dividend payout increases with the fraction
of female directors, independent of how the latter is measured. These results provide support for our main hypothesis that female
directors are more likely to use high dividend payouts as a monitoring device than their male counterparts.5 The difference between the two coefﬁcients is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
6 In anuntabulated regression,we include the tenureweighted fractions of female independent directors and female insider directors but exclude the fraction ofmale
independent directors. The results are virtually identical to those of regression (5). Again, the fraction of female independent directors is signiﬁcant at the 5% level,
whereas the fraction of female insider directors is not signiﬁcant.
Table 2
Summary statistics.
This table reports the means and standard deviations of the variables used in this study for the entire sample and for the subsamples of ﬁrms with and without female
directors as well as the subsamples of ﬁrms with and without dividends. For each variable, the differences between the two subsamples are reported along with t-sta-
tistics based on the two-sample t-test. Appendix A contains a detailed deﬁnition of all the variables.
Variable
Whole sample Firm-year obs.
with female
directors
Firm-year obs.
without female
directors
Firm-year
obs. with
dividends
Firm-year obs.
with
no dividend
N = 12.050 N = 7969 N = 4081 N = 7214 N = 4837
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Diff t-stat Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Diff t-stat
Dividend/TA 0.014 0.021 0.016 0.021 0.008 0.019 0.008⁎⁎⁎ 19.7 0.023 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.023⁎⁎⁎ 70.011
DPS/Share price 0.014 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.007 0.015 0.010⁎⁎⁎ 28.2 0.023 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.023⁎⁎⁎ 83.975
Dividend per share (DPS) 0.450 0.598 0.582 0.642 0.194 0.387 0.388⁎⁎⁎ 35.5 0.752 0.608 0.000 0.000 0.752⁎⁎⁎ 85.999
Dividend/NI 0.229 0.459 0.280 0.486 0.128 0.384 0.152⁎⁎⁎ 17.4 0.382 0.542 0.000 0.000 0.382⁎⁎⁎ 49.021
Dividend/Sales 0.016 0.024 0.020 0.026 0.009 0.020 0.011⁎⁎⁎ 23.5 0.027 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.027⁎⁎⁎ 71.476
Fraction of female dirs 0.103 0.093 0.155 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.155⁎⁎⁎ 140.0 0.120 0.090 0.076 0.090 0.044⁎⁎⁎ 26.090
Fraction of female indep. dirs. 0.092 0.087 0.139 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.139⁎⁎⁎ 130.0 0.109 0.085 0.067 0.083 0.042⁎⁎⁎ 26.980
Fraction of female insider dirs. 0.006 0.027 0.009 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.009⁎⁎⁎ 17.2 0.005 0.026 0.006 0.029 −0.001⁎ −1.838
Fraction of male indep. dirs. 0.620 0.152 0.600 0.138 0.659 0.171 −0.059⁎⁎⁎ −20.6 0.619 0.146 0.621 0.161 −0.002 −0.635
Leverage 0.219 0.165 0.239 0.157 0.180 0.172 0.060⁎⁎⁎ 19.1 0.241 0.150 0.187 0.180 0.054⁎⁎⁎ 17.861
R&D/Sales 0.048 0.227 0.036 0.138 0.073 0.337 −0.038⁎⁎⁎ −8.7 0.019 0.041 0.092 0.350 −0.073⁎⁎⁎ −17.522
Tobin's q 1.942 1.314 1.903 1.307 2.016 1.325 −0.113⁎⁎⁎ −4.5 1.819 1.116 2.124 1.546 −0.304⁎⁎⁎ −12.544
ROA 0.146 0.089 0.150 0.081 0.138 0.102 0.012⁎⁎⁎ 6.9 0.156 0.074 0.131 0.105 0.024⁎⁎⁎ 14.926
Return volatility 0.041 0.039 0.035 0.033 0.053 0.047 −0.017⁎⁎⁎ −23.7 0.030 0.028 0.050 0.045 −0.020⁎⁎⁎ −29.524
Cash/net assets 0.234 0.504 0.183 0.418 0.334 0.627 −0.151⁎⁎⁎ −15.8 0.137 0.279 0.379 0.694 −0.242⁎⁎⁎ −26.590
PPE/TA 0.312 0.234 0.328 0.232 0.281 0.235 0.047⁎⁎⁎ 10.4 0.354 0.231 0.250 0.224 0.104⁎⁎⁎ 24.425
TA ($m) 5727 10,643 7730 12,340 1816 3738 5914⁎⁎⁎ 29.9 8011 12,675 2319 4818 5691⁎⁎⁎ 29.818
Ln (TA) 7.520 1.488 7.935 1.465 6.710 1.164 1.225⁎⁎⁎ 46.4 7.939 1.503 6.894 1.223 1.045⁎⁎⁎ 40.251
Board size 9.282 2.377 10.070 2.244 7.743 1.807 2.328⁎⁎⁎ 57.4 10.018 2.334 8.184 1.983 1.835⁎⁎⁎ 44.877
Fraction of independent dirs 0.712 0.159 0.739 0.146 0.659 0.171 0.080⁎⁎⁎ 26.8 0.728 0.155 0.687 0.162 0.040⁎⁎⁎ 13.783
CEO Chairman 0.617 0.486 0.655 0.475 0.541 0.498 0.115⁎⁎⁎ 12.3 0.680 0.467 0.522 0.500 0.158⁎⁎⁎ 17.677
CEO tenure 8.120 7.359 7.260 6.345 9.801 8.777 −2.541⁎⁎⁎ −18.2 7.685 7.018 8.770 7.795 −1.086⁎⁎⁎ −7.959
E index 2.571 1.295 2.690 1.281 2.339 1.292 0.351⁎⁎⁎ 14.2 2.648 1.307 2.457 1.269 0.191⁎⁎⁎ 7.965⁎⁎
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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gorge free cash to shareholders in the absence of other such devices. Indeed, Cash/net assets has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on
the dividend payout in four of the ﬁve regressions that include this control variable. In contrast, leverage has a signiﬁcantly neg-
ative effect on the dividend payout. Given that both debt and high dividend payouts are ways to mitigate Jensen's (1986) free
cash ﬂow problem, the negative sign on Leverage makes perfect sense (see also Benito and Young, 2003). The positive sign on
ROA and the negative sign on Return volatility are also in line with the existing literature (Jagannathan et al., 2000).
Importantly, the corporate governance variables are all signiﬁcant. Board size has a positive effect on the dividend payout.7 In
line with Hu and Kumar (2004), we ﬁnd a positive effect of board independence on the dividend payout.8 Again, this is in line
with dividends being a monitoring device. We also ﬁnd that duality increases the dividend payout. This is in contrast to Hu
and Kumar (2004) who do not ﬁnd any effect of duality on the dividend payout. CEO tenure has been argued to increase CEO
power (see e.g. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989) and should therefore decrease the dividend payout. All four regressions,
which include CEO tenure (i.e., regressions (3) to (6)), suggest that this is the case. Conversely, Hu and Kumar (2004) do not
ﬁnd that CEO tenure affects the payout.9 Similar to CEO tenure, the entrenchment index also decreases the dividend payout.
3.2. Robustness tests
The robustness test results shown in Appendix C conﬁrm that the positive effect of the fraction of female directors on the div-
idend payout persists when (i) a different measure is used for the dividend payout (i.e., dividends over total assets, dividend yield,
dividends per share, and dividends over total sales); (ii) a different estimation technique is used (i.e., Tobit regressions, and Fama-
MacBeth regressions); (iii) ﬁrm-year observations for Telecom, and Utilities are excluded; (iv) observations with female CEOs are7 The correlation betweenboard size andﬁrm size (total assets) is highwith a value of 0.45 (see the correlationmatrix reported inAppendixB).Whenwe include just
one of the two size variables at a time in the ﬁrst four regressions from Table 3 (not tabulated), each of the two variables is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all
four regressions. In addition, we regress board size on ﬁrm size and then include the residuals from this regression as well as ﬁrm size in the ﬁrst four regressions from
Table 3 (the results are not tabulated). We ﬁnd that both board size and ﬁrm size are now positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level across all four regressions. Since this
strong correlation also concerns the robustness of our results, we revisit this issue in the robustness tests in Section 3.2.
8 More precisely, Hu and Kumar (2004) ﬁnd that board independence increases the dividend payout only if it exceeds 40%.
9 Nevertheless, Hu and Kumar (2004) ﬁnd that the CEO's length of servicewith the ﬁrm (which also includes the years spentwith the ﬁrm before being appointed as
the CEO) has a signiﬁcant and positive effect on the dividend payout.
Table 3
Board gender composition and dividend payouts.
This table reports the results of the OLS regressions for the relationship between board gender composition and dividend payouts. The dependent variable is dividends
over net income. Independent variables include the following. Fraction of female dirs (Fraction of female dirs_tw) is the equally-weighted (tenure-weighted)measure of
the fraction of female directors on the board. Fraction of female indep. dirs (Fraction of female insider dirs) is the fraction of independent (insider) directors on the board,
computed as the number of female independent (inside) directors divided by the total number of independent (insider) directors on the board. Fraction of male indep.
dirs is thenumber ofmale independent directors divided by the total number of independent directors on the board. Leverage is the sumof short- and long-termdebts to
total assets. R&D/Sales is the R&D expenditures divided by total net sales. Tobin's q is the market value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of equity, all di-
vided by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets. Return volatility is the volatility of ROA over the past
ﬁve years. Cash/net assets is cash andmarketable securities divided by net assets. PPE/TA is net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Ln (TA) is the nat-
ural logarithm of the deﬂated total assets in 2009 dollars. Board size is the total number of directors on the board. Fraction of independent directors is the number of in-
dependent directors divided by the board size. CEO Chairman is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. CEO
tenure is the number of years the CEO has been in position. E index is the entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al. (2009). CEO ownership is the percentage stock ownership
of the CEO. Industry- and year-ﬁxed effects are included in all the regressions. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classiﬁcation. Sta-
tistical signiﬁcance is based on heteroskedasticity robust ﬁrm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses.
Variable
OLS regressions
Dependent variable: Dividend/NI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.351⁎
(0.182)
0.196
(0.187)
0.149
(0.179)
0.164
(0.179)
0.147
(0.179)
0.139
(0.196)
Fraction of female dirst − 1 0.404⁎⁎⁎
(0.069)
0.277⁎⁎⁎
(0.071)
0.167⁎⁎
(0.069)
– – 0.166⁎⁎
(0.070)
Fraction of female dirs_twt − 1 – – – 0.172⁎⁎
(0.067)
– –
Fraction of female indep. dirst − 1 – – – – 0.253⁎⁎⁎
(0.080)
–
Fraction of female insider dirst − 1 – – – – 0.221
(0.235)
–
Fraction of male indep. dirst − 1 – – – – 0.108⁎⁎⁎
(0.038)
–
Leveraget − 1 – −0.096⁎⁎
(0.044)
−0.090⁎⁎
(0.043)
−0.092⁎⁎
(0.042)
−0.090⁎⁎
(0.043)
−0.083⁎
(0.043)
R&D/Salest − 1 – −0.008
(0.028)
−0.015
(0.027)
−0.016
(0.027)
−0.015
(0.027)
−0.015
(0.027)
Tobin's qt − 1 – −0.003
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.004)
ROAt − 1 – 0.135⁎⁎
(0.064)
0.126⁎⁎
(0.063)
0.125⁎⁎
(0.063)
0.126⁎⁎
(0.063)
0.113⁎
(0.064)
Return volatilityt − 1 – −0.693⁎⁎⁎
(0.137)
−0.680⁎⁎⁎
(0.133)
−0.678⁎⁎⁎
(0.133)
−0.684⁎⁎⁎
(0.133)
−0.685⁎⁎⁎
(0.135)
Cash/net assetst − 1 – 0.023
(0.014)
0.029⁎
(0.015)
0.028⁎
(0.015)
0.029⁎
(0.015)
0.029⁎
(0.015)
PPE/TAt − 1 – 0.061
(0.048)
0.066
(0.046)
0.067
(0.046)
0.067
(0.047)
0.057
(0.047)
Ln (TA)t − 1 – 0.024⁎⁎⁎
(0.006)
0.005
(0.006)
0.005
(0.006)
0.005
(0.006)
0.005
(0.006)
Board sizet − 1 – – 0.019⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.019⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.019⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.019⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
Fraction of independent directorst − 1 – – 0.109⁎⁎⁎
(0.038)
0.107⁎⁎⁎
(0.037)
– 0.118⁎⁎⁎
(0.039)
CEO Chairmant − 1 – – 0.027⁎⁎
(0.011)
0.026⁎⁎
(0.011)
0.027⁎⁎
(0.012)
0.024⁎⁎
(0.012)
CEO tenuret − 1 – – −0.002⁎⁎
(0.001)
−0.002⁎⁎
(0.001)
−0.002⁎⁎
(0.001)
−0.002⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
E indext − 1 – – −0.011⁎⁎
(0.005)
−0.011⁎⁎
(0.005)
−0.010⁎⁎
(0.005)
−0.011⁎⁎
(0.005)
CEO ownershipt − 1 – – – – – 0.206⁎
(0.115)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12,050 12,050 12,050 12,050 12,050 11,739
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.124 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.131
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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are excluded; (vi) the square of the fraction of female directors is also included, thereby allowing for a non-linear relationship
between the dividend payout and female board representation10; (vii) controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity; (viii)10 Note that the square of the fraction of female directors is only signiﬁcant, and negative, when the dependent variable is the dividend yield. This regression suggests
that the dividend yield increases with the fraction of female directors until the latter reaches 0.27, and then decreases.
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sity11; (ix) the board size and ﬁrm size variables are included one at a time; and (x) regressing board size on ﬁrm size and then
including the residuals from this regression as well as ﬁrm size in the baseline dividend payout regressions.123.3. Identiﬁcation
The challenge we face when attempting to identify a causal effect of female board representation on the dividend payout is the
possibility of omitted variable bias. For example, managers that are more responsive to investor demands for higher dividends may
also be more responsive to calls for greater board diversity. This would suggest that the fraction of female directors is endogenous.
This section addresses these endogeneity concerns in the following three different ways. First, we conduct propensity score
matching whereby ﬁrm-years with female directors are matched with ﬁrm-years without female directors, but with no signiﬁcant
differences in terms of all the other variables. Second, we employ an instrumental variable approach to adjust for the possible
endogeneity of the fraction of female directors. Third, we also perform a difference-in-differences analysis that compares the chang-
es in dividend payout around female director appointments to the changes in a matched sample of male director appointments.3.3.1. Propensity score matching estimates
Table 4 compares the dividend payout (using various measures) and the dividend yield for ﬁrms with female directors with
those for ﬁrms without female directors that have been matched via propensity score matching with the former. We ﬁrst estimate
the probability that a ﬁrm hires female directors. This probability (i.e., the propensity score) is the predicted value from a logit
regression using the same controls as those included in regression (3) of Table 3. The logit regression results are reported in col-
umn (1) of Panel A of Table 4. Consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2009), we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with female directors are larger and
have better performance as measured by ROA. The pseudo R-square for the regression is high with a value of 0.301.
Next, we adopt the nearest neighbor approach to ensure that ﬁrms with female directors (i.e., the treatment group) are suf-
ﬁciently similar to the matched ﬁrms without female directors (i.e., the control group). Speciﬁcally, each ﬁrm with female direc-
tors on its board is matched to a ﬁrm without female directors and with the closest propensity score. If a ﬁrm in the control group
is matched to more than one ﬁrm in the treatment group, we retain only the pair for which the difference between the propensity
scores of the two ﬁrms is the smallest.13 We further require that the maximum difference between the propensity score of each
ﬁrm with female directors and that of its matched peer does not exceed 0.1% in absolute value.14
To verify that ﬁrms in the treatment and control groups are indistinguishable in terms of observable characteristics, we conduct two
diagnostic tests. The ﬁrst test consists of re-estimating the logit model for the post-match sample. The results are shown in column (2) of
Panel A of Table 4. None of the coefﬁcient estimates is statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that there are no distinguishable trends in div-
idend payouts between the twogroups. Furthermore, the coefﬁcients in column (2) aremuch smaller inmagnitude than those in column
(1), suggesting that the results in column (2) are not simply an artifact of a decline in degrees of freedom in the restricted sample. Finally,
the pseudo R-square drops substantially from 0.301 for the pre-match sample to 0.003 for the post-match sample. This suggests that the
propensity score matching removes all observable differences other than the difference in the presence of female directors.
The second test consists of examining the difference for each observable characteristic between the treatment ﬁrms and the
matched control ﬁrms. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 4. Again, none of the differences in observable characteristics
between the treatment and control ﬁrms is statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, the diagnostic test results suggest that the propensity
score matching removes all observable differences other than the difference in the presence of female directors. Thus, this increases
the likelihood that any difference in dividend payouts between the two groups is due to the presence of female directors on boards.
Finally, Panel C of Table 4 reports the propensity score matching estimates.15 The results indicate that there are signiﬁcant dif-
ferences (all at the 1% level) in dividend payouts – for all ﬁve measures – between ﬁrms with female directors and those without.
In detail, ﬁrms with female directors have greater dividends per share, dividends over total assets, dividends over net income, div-
idends over total sales, and greater dividend yields than the otherwise indistinguishable ﬁrms without female directors.3.3.2. Instrumental variable approach
To address the endogeneity concern, we employ the instrumental variable approach to extract the exogenous component from
board gender composition and then use it to explain the dividend payout. We use separately as well as jointly two different in-
strumental variables that capture a ﬁrm's likelihood of having female directors, but are uncorrelated with the dividend payout,
except through the variables we control for. Our ﬁrst instrument is the fraction of a ﬁrm's male directors who sit on other boards
with at least one female director. This instrument is also used by Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Levi et al. (2014). The more con-
nected a ﬁrm's male directors are to women, the more female directors should be expected on the ﬁrm's board (Adams and
Ferreira, 2009). Thus, we expect this instrumental variable to be positively correlated with the fraction of female directors.11 Director age (tenure) diversity is calculated as the standard deviation of director age (tenure) divided by the average age (tenure) of all the directors on the board.
12 See footnote 7 about the rationale behind (ix) and (x).
13 As a robustness test we allow for control ﬁrms to be matched to multiple treatment ﬁrms. The results do not change qualitatively.
14 Our results remain robust when we increase the maximum permissible difference in propensity scores to 1.0% and 0.5% in absolute value (untabulated).
15 The difference inmeans between the treatment group andmatched control group is the propensity scorematching estimate of the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT).
Table 4
Propensity score matching estimator.
This table reports the propensity score matching estimation results. Panel A reports the parameter estimates from the logit model used to estimate the propensity
scores. The dependent variable is an indicator variable set to one if there are female directors in the ﬁrm in a given year, and zero otherwise. Independent variables in-
clude the following. Leverage is the sumof short- and long-term debts to total assets. R&D/Sales is the R&D expenditures divided by total net sales. Tobin's q is themarket
value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided
by total assets.Return volatilities is the volatility of ROAover the pastﬁve years. Cash/net assets is cash andmarketable securities divided bynet assets. PPE/TA is net prop-
erty, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Ln (TA) is the natural logarithmof the deﬂated total assets in 2009 dollars. Board size is the total number of directors on
the board. Fraction of independent directors is the number of independent directors divided by the board size. CEO Chairman is an indicator variable equal to one if the
CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been in position. E index is the entrenchment index of Bebchuk
et al. (2009) and it is constructed based on six provisions. Industry and year ﬁxed effects are included in all regressions. Industry effects are constructed based on the
Fama-French 49-industry classiﬁcation. Statistical signiﬁcance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust ﬁrm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Panel A
reports the pre-match propensity score regression and the post-match diagnostic regression. Panel B reports the univariate comparisons ofﬁrm characteristics between
ﬁrms with andwithout female directors and the corresponding t-statistics. Panel C reports estimates of the average treatment effects. The dependent variables include
dividends per share, dividends to total assets, dividend yield, the dividend payout ratio and dividends to total sales.
Panel A: Pre-match propensity score regression and post-match diagnostic regression
Dependent variable:
Equals 1 if female directors are on the board and 0 otherwise
Pre-match Post-match
(1) (2)
Intercept −7.743⁎⁎⁎
(1.276)
0.341
(1.200)
Leveraget − 1 −0.285
(0.351)
0.042
(0.361)
R&D/Salest − 1 −0.134
(0.285)
0.006
(0.330)
Tobin's qt − 1 0.038
(0.038)
−0.008
(0.045)
ROAt − 1 1.237⁎⁎
(0.597)
−0.225
(0.619)
Return volatilityt − 1 −2.379⁎
(1.327)
0.010
(1.315)
Cash/net assetst − 1 0.104
(0.083)
−0.005
(0.085)
PPE/TAt − 1 0.203
(0.393)
0.038
(0.429)
Ln (TA)t − 1 0.399⁎⁎⁎
(0.052)
−0.024
(0.058)
Board sizet − 1 0.428⁎⁎⁎
(0.032)
0.012
(0.032)
Fraction of independent directorst − 1 2.314⁎⁎⁎
(0.340)
−0.115
(0.354)
CEO Chairmant − 1 0.250⁎⁎
(0.099)
−0.058
(0.108)
CEO tenuret − 1 −0.031⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
0.002
(0.007)
E indext − 1 0.082⁎
(0.044)
0.002
(0.048)
Industry effects Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
N 12,017 4836
Pseudo R2 0.301 0.003
Panel B: Differences in ﬁrm characteristics
Firm-year obs. with female dirs.
(N = 2418)
Firm-year obs. without female dirs.
(N = 2418) Difference t-stat
Leveraget − 1 0.195 0.196 0.000 −0.039
R&D/Salest − 1 0.055 0.054 0.001 0.275
Tobin's qt − 1 1.930 1.955 −0.024 −0.672
ROAt − 1 0.142 0.144 −0.002 −0.938
Return volatilityt − 1 0.043 0.043 0.000 −0.066
Cash/net assetst − 1 0.287 0.286 0.001 0.063
PPE/TAt − 1 0.282 0.286 −0.004 −0.655
Ln (TA)t − 1 6.938 6.948 −0.010 −0.302
Board sizet − 1 8.388 8.343 0.045 0.869
Fraction of independent directorst − 1 0.688 0.690 −0.002 −0.391
CEO Chairmant − 1 0.551 0.564 −0.013 −0.926
CEO tenuret − 1 8.866 8.868 −0.002 −0.011
E indext − 1 2.543 2.548 −0.005 −0.136
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Panel C: Propensity score matching estimator
Variable
Firm-year obs. with female dirs.
(N = 2418)
Firm-year obs. without female dirs.
(N = 2418) Difference t-stat
Dividend per share (DPS) 0.309 0.228 0.081⁎⁎⁎ 6.390
Dividend/TA 0.011 0.009 0.002⁎⁎⁎ 3.720
DPS/Share price 0.185 0.141 0.044⁎⁎⁎ 3.520
Dividend/NI 0.011 0.008 0.003⁎⁎⁎ 5.520
Dividend/Sales 0.012 0.010 0.002⁎⁎⁎ 3.320
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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95J. Chen et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 43 (2017) 86–105Our second instrument is the female-to-male participation ratio, which is computed as the female participation ratio divided
by the male participation ratio for the state where the ﬁrm is headquartered. The female (male) participation ratio is measured as
the percentage of the civilian non-institutional population of the female (male) group in the civilian labor force. The data comes
from the US Census Bureau website and is updated annually. The rationale for using this instrument is that ﬁrms in states where
the female-to-male participation ratio is higher are more likely to ﬁnd good female candidates for their board of directors, ceteris
paribus, as they are able to tap into larger talent pools. Thus, we argue that the greater the female-to-male participation ratio, the
greater should be the fraction of female directors on the board. Yet little evidence, if any, suggests that a ﬁrm's dividend policy is
correlated with the female-to-male participation ratio of that state.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results of the ﬁrst-stage regressions where the dependent variable is the fraction of female di-
rectors. The explanatory variables include the above mentioned instruments and the same control variables as in regression (3) of
Table 3. For brevity, we report only the coefﬁcient estimates for the main variables of interest. Regression (1) uses the fraction of
male directors linked to female directors as an instrument, regression (2) uses the female-to-male participation ratio, and regres-
sion (3) uses both instruments. Consistent with the rationale behind the instruments, the fraction of female directors is positively
correlated to the fraction of male directors linked to female directors as well as to the female-to-male participation ratio. The co-
efﬁcient estimates for the instruments in regressions (1) and (2) are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level suggesting that our
instruments are valid. In regression (3), the coefﬁcients on the two instruments remain positive and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. The reported F-statistics are very high for all three regressions suggesting that none of our instruments is weak. Fur-
thermore, the p-value of the Cragg-Donald's Wald F weak-instrument test statistic is 0.000 for all three regressions, again rejecting
the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak (Cragg and Donald, 1993; Stock and Yogo, 2005).16 The last test we conduct on
the validity of our instruments is the Hansen (1982) J over-identiﬁcation test in regression (3), which uses both instruments. The
p-value indicates that the instruments are valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results for the second-stage regressions whose dependent variable is dividends over net income. The
variable of interest is the variable with the predicted values of the fraction of female directors from the ﬁrst-stage regressions. All three
regressions conﬁrm the signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) and positive effect of the fraction of female directors on the dividend payout. This is
consistent with our main hypothesis and suggests that our key result is not due to the endogeneity of the fraction of female directors.
There is some concern that our ﬁrst instrument, the fraction of male directors linked to female directors, is a proxy for the
connectedness of the board, which could be correlated with ﬁrm performance, and in turn dividend payouts. To address this con-
cern, we follow Adams and Ferreira (2009) and use two more direct measures of board connectedness as additional controls: the
total number of external board seats held by the directors and the total number of external board seats held by the male directors.
The results are presented in Appendix D. The inclusion of these two more direct measures conﬁrms our existing results.
Moreover, the fraction of male directors connected to female directors on other boards might be correlated with ﬁrm dividend
policy through industry effects. We address this possibility in the following three ways. First, we exclude observations with direc-
tors sitting on the boards of their industry peer ﬁrms from the sample for the IV analysis (not tabulated). The results continue to
hold. Second, we control for the following two variables (one at a time) that measure board connectedness in the same industry:
the fraction of directors who sit on other boards in the same industry and the fraction of male directors who sit on other boards
with a female presence in the same industry. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported when these variables are in-
cluded. Finally, we consider a variation of the ﬁrst instrument. This alternative instrument is deﬁned as the fraction of a ﬁrm's
male directors who (i) sit on boards with a female presence in other industries, and (ii) do not sit on other boards with a female
presence in the same industry. We conﬁrm that our results are not sensitive to this alternative deﬁnition of the instrument.
3.3.3. Difference-in-differences matching estimates
Our third identiﬁcation strategy is to employ a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis around female director appointments to
identify the effect of female board representation on the dividend payout. The DID approach compares the outcomes for two sim-
ilar groups with and without the treatment but that would otherwise be subject to similar inﬂuence from the trending variables.
Therefore, it increases the likelihood that any difference in the changes in outcomes before and after the treatment between the
two groups is due to the impact of the treatment rather than the difference between the two groups prior to treatment.16 Panel A of Table 5 also shows the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak ID test critical values, which are for the Cragg-DonaldWald F-statistics. In all regressions, the F-sta-
tistics are much larger than their Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values based on 2SLS size. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak.
Table 5
IV estimator.
This table presents estimates using the instrumental variablesmethod based on two-stage least square (2SLS) panel regressions. Panel A presents theﬁrst-stage regres-
sion resultswhere the dependent variable is the equally-weighted fraction of female directors. The instrumental variables are as follows. Fraction ofmale directors linked
to female directors is the fraction of male directors on the boardwho sit on other boardswith at least one female director. Female-to-male participation ratio is the ratio of
the female labor force participation rate to the male labor force participation rate in a state for a given year. The estimated parameters of the other controls are not re-
ported for brevity. Panel B reports the second-stage regression results. The dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio, calculated as dividends divided by net in-
come. The same set of control variables, industry and yearﬁxed effects as in our baselinemodels are included. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French
49-industry classiﬁcation. Statistical signiﬁcance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust ﬁrm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. The Stock and Yogo
(2005) weak ID test critical values are for the Cragg-DonaldWald F-statistics. A higher Cragg-DonaldWald F-statistic than the corresponding critical value indicates a
rejection of the null hypothesis that the instrument(s) are weak.
Panel A: First-stage regressions
Variable
Dependent variable: Fraction of female dirs
(1) (2) (3)
Fraction of male directors linked to female directors 0.046⁎⁎⁎
(0.009)
– 0.044⁎⁎⁎
(0.009)
Female-to-male participation ratio – 0.224⁎⁎⁎
(0.058)
0.208⁎⁎⁎
(0.058)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
N 11,860 12,011 11,821
F-statistic 27.150⁎⁎⁎ 14.930⁎⁎⁎ 20.060⁎⁎⁎
Cragg-Donald (CD) Wald F-statistic 127.150 85.670 100.500
Stock and Yogo (2005) weak ID test critical value 16.380 16.380 19.930
J-statistic for over-identiﬁcation – – 1.950
p-value 0.163
Panel B: Second-stage regressions
Variable
Dependent variable: Dividend/NI
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.390
(0.245)
0.589⁎⁎
(0.298)
0.470⁎
(0.258)
Fraction of female directorst − 1(Fitted) 2.328⁎⁎⁎
(0.804)
4.137⁎⁎⁎
(1.192)
3.064⁎⁎⁎
(0.683)
Leveraget − 1 −0.095⁎
(0.049)
−0.090
(0.061)
−0.095⁎
(0.053)
R&D/Salest − 1 −0.009
(0.025)
−0.004
(0.026)
−0.006
(0.025)
Tobin's qt − 1 −0.004
(0.005)
−0.006
(0.007)
−0.005
(0.006)
ROAt − 1 0.068
(0.081)
0.026
(0.108)
0.049
(0.090)
Return volatilityt − 1 −0.542⁎⁎⁎
(0.167)
−0.424⁎
(0.221)
−0.494⁎⁎⁎
(0.184)
Cash/net assetst − 1 0.020
(0.016)
0.013
(0.018)
0.017
(0.016)
PPE/TAt − 1 0.079
(0.050)
0.095
(0.062)
0.083
(0.054)
Ln (TA)t − 1 −0.018⁎
(0.011)
−0.037⁎⁎
(0.015)
−0.026⁎⁎
(0.010)
Board sizet − 1 0.007
(0.006)
−0.004
(0.008)
0.003
(0.005)
Fraction of independent directorst − 1 −0.081
(0.080)
−0.245⁎⁎
(0.121)
−0.145⁎
(0.075)
CEO Chairmant − 1 −0.001
(0.017)
−0.023
(0.022)
−0.010
(0.017)
CEO tenuret − 1 0.001
(0.001)
0.003
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
E indext − 1 −0.014⁎⁎
(0.006)
−0.018⁎⁎
(0.008)
−0.016⁎⁎
(0.007)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
N 11,860 12,011 11,821
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 6
Difference-in-differences matching estimator.
This table reports the difference-in-differences matching estimation results. Panel A examines the differences in observable characteristics between ﬁrm-years with fe-
male director appointments and theirmatched controls in thepre-treatment year. Panel B reports thedifference-in-differences estimateswhere thedependent variable
is the dividend payout ratio, calculated as dividends divided by net income. The treatment group consists of ﬁrms that replace a departing male director aged above 60
with a female director and the control group consists of ﬁrms that replace a departingmale director aged above 60with anothermale director.Wematch treatment and
control observations using propensity score matching. Female appointment is an indicator variable that equals one if the ﬁrm appoints a female director, and zero oth-
erwise. Post is an indicator variable that equals one in the period after the appointment, and zero otherwise. The same set of control variables as in our baselinemodels is
included. For the sake of brevity,we report only the coefﬁcients on themain variables of interest. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry
classiﬁcation. Statistical signiﬁcance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust ﬁrm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Post-match differences
Treatment Control Differences t-statistics
Leverage 0.218 0.230 −0.012 −0.454
R&D/Sales 0.036 0.026 0.010 0.878
Tobin's q 1.763 1.644 0.119 0.761
ROA 0.135 0.129 0.005 0.415
Return volatility 0.036 0.030 0.006 1.246
Cash/net assets 0.212 0.215 −0.003 −0.061
PPE/TA 0.298 0.284 0.014 0.392
Ln (TA) 7.867 7.856 0.011 0.047
Board size 9.770 9.784 −0.014 −0.040
Fraction of independent directors 0.736 0.736 0.000 0.001
CEO Chairman 0.608 0.500 0.108 1.322
CEO tenure 6.419 5.689 0.730 0.765
E index 2.973 3.027 −0.054 −0.252
Panel B: Difference-in-differences estimator
Dependent variable: Dividend/NI
(1) (2)
Female appointment −0.157⁎⁎
(0.063)
−0.132
(0.106)
Post −0.235⁎⁎⁎
(0.077)
−0.186⁎⁎
(0.071)
Female appointment × Post 0.220⁎⁎⁎
(0.084)
0.150⁎⁎
(0.067)
All controls Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes No
Firm ﬁxed effects No Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
N 296 296
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.285
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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of the appointment. To be included in the treatment group, a ﬁrm must appoint only one female director to replace a departing
male director in the appointment year. We further require the departing male director to be older than 60 to ensure that the di-
rector turnover is less likely driven by unobserved factors, such as changes in corporate strategy.17 The application of these criteria
results in 74 female director appointments for our treatment group. For the control group, we identify 474 observations where a
departing male director aged above 60 is replaced with one newly appointed male director.
We thenmatch treatment and control observations using propensity scorematching to ensure that theDID estimator is not driven by
differences in CEO, ﬁrm or industry characteristics. The matching procedure is analogous to that described in Section 3.3.1.18 Eventually,
we obtain 74 pairs of matched ﬁrms. In Panel A of Table 6, we examine the differences in observable characteristics between ﬁrm-years
with female director appointments and their matched controls in the pre-treatment year. The univariate comparisons indicate that no
statistically signiﬁcant differences exist in observable characteristics between the two groups. Based on this closely matched sample,
we estimate the following panel regression.17 As a
18 We
director
in the c
ferenceDividend payouti;t ¼ α þ β1  Female appointmenti;t þ β2  Posti;t
þβ3  Female appointmenti;t  Posti;t þ γZi;t þ Industryi þ Yeart þ εi;t ð2Þrobustness check, we require the departing director to be older than 65, resulting in amore restricted sample of 57matched pairs. The results continue to hold.
start the matching by estimating the probability, or propensity score, of a ﬁrm replacing a departing male director with a female director rather than a male
.We use the same explanatory variables as in the regressions in Panel A of Table 4.We thenmatch each observation in the treatment groupwith the observation
ontrol group with the closest propensity score. To ensure that the observations in the treatment and control groups are sufﬁciently similar, we require the dif-
in propensity scores between the two groups to be less than 5% in absolute value.
Table 7
Board gender diversity, dividend payouts and corporate governance.
This table presents the OLS regression results separately for ﬁrms with different levels of managerial entrenchment. The six proxies for managerial entrenchment are as follows. E Index is the entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al.
(2009). CEO Chairman is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO also assumes the title of Chairman, and zero otherwise. Tech is an indicator variable equal to one for technology ﬁrms, and zero for non-technology ﬁrms. CEO
tenure is the number of years the CEOhas been in position. Fraction of independent directors is thenumber of independent directors divided by board size. Four-FirmConcentration Ratio is the fraction of a 5-digit NAICS industry's sales
accounted for by its largest four ﬁrms and is a proxy for industry competition. Firms are split into high and low subsamples based on the samplemedian for a given variable. For example, a ﬁrm is included in the high Product market
competition subsample if its value for Four-ﬁrm concentration ratio is below the sample median, and is included in the low competition subsample otherwise. In addition, a ﬁrm is in the high E index, CEO tenure and Board indepen-
dence subsample if its E index, CEO tenure or Fraction of independent directors is above the samplemedian, and vice versa. Managers are considered to bemore entrenched if the ﬁrm is a non-technology ﬁrm, has a high E index, high
CEO tenure, low Board independence, or low Product market competition, or has a chairman CEO. The dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio, calculated as dividends divided by net income. The same set of control variables,
industry and year ﬁxed effects as in our baseline models are included. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classiﬁcation. Statistical signiﬁcance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust ﬁrm-
clustered standard errors reported in brackets.
E index CEO chairman Industry CEO tenure Board independence Product market
competition
High Low Yes No Non-Tech Tech High Low Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept 0.288
(0.207)
−0.052
(0.182)
−0.075
(0.113)
0.777⁎⁎⁎
(0.186)
−0.013
(0.077)
−0.406⁎⁎⁎
(0.132)
−0.079
(0.121)
0.623⁎⁎⁎
(0.229)
0.024
(0.070)
−0.001
(0.146)
−0.072
(0.087)
0.341⁎⁎⁎
(0.112)
Fraction of female dirst − 1 0.286⁎⁎⁎
(0.092)
0.017
(0.086)
0.269⁎⁎⁎
(0.086)
−0.014
(0.103)
0.253⁎⁎⁎
(0.094)
0.405
(0.297)
0.279⁎⁎⁎
(0.089)
0.063
(0.083)
0.195⁎⁎
(0.085)
0.145
(0.093)
0.229⁎⁎
(0.104)
0.107
(0.116)
Leveraget – 1 −0.002
(0.056)
−0.176⁎⁎⁎
(0.058)
−0.070
(0.056)
−0.103⁎
(0.058)
−0.022
(0.059)
0.179
(0.128)
−0.088⁎
(0.051)
−0.092
(0.058)
−0.135⁎⁎⁎
(0.052)
0.015
(0.061)
−0.024
(0.077)
−0.105⁎
(0.060)
R&D/Salest – 1 −0.076⁎
(0.040)
0.007
(0.022)
−0.026
(0.037)
−0.005
(0.026)
−0.122⁎⁎
(0.050)
0.022⁎
(0.011)
−0.065⁎
(0.035)
0.014
(0.019)
−0.044
(0.039)
0.009
(0.018)
0.016
(0.014)
−0.106⁎
(0.064)
Tobin's qt − 1 0.003
(0.006)
−0.003
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.005)
−0.001
(0.006)
−0.003
(0.006)
0.001
(0.006)
0.002
(0.005)
−0.005
(0.006)
−0.003
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.006)
−0.005
(0.005)
−0.004
(0.006)
ROAt − 1 0.041
(0.086)
0.194⁎⁎
(0.085)
0.068
(0.083)
0.194⁎⁎
(0.091)
0.164⁎
(0.089)
0.292⁎⁎
(0.133)
0.039
(0.085)
0.191⁎
(0.098)
0.002
(0.082)
0.201⁎⁎
(0.087)
0.165
(0.105)
0.143
(0.120)
Return volatilityt − 1 −0.730⁎⁎⁎
(0.187)
−0.606⁎⁎⁎
(0.177)
−0.666⁎⁎⁎
(0.194)
−0.696⁎⁎⁎
(0.157)
−0.946⁎⁎⁎
(0.177)
−0.199
(0.236)
−0.412⁎⁎
(0.178)
−1.012⁎⁎⁎
(0.194)
−0.733⁎⁎⁎
(0.173)
−0.772⁎⁎⁎
(0.197)
−0.712⁎⁎⁎
(0.195)
−0.698⁎⁎
(0.284)
Cash/net assetst − 1 0.038
(0.032)
0.026⁎
(0.014)
0.030
(0.020)
0.032⁎
(0.019)
0.052⁎⁎
(0.026)
0.043⁎
(0.024)
0.028⁎⁎
(0.014)
0.033
(0.033)
0.054⁎⁎
(0.026)
−0.001
(0.012)
0.006
(0.010)
0.065⁎⁎
(0.033)
PPE/TAt − 1 0.076
(0.065)
0.068
(0.055)
0.044
(0.058)
0.104
(0.068)
0.069
(0.050)
0.514⁎⁎⁎
(0.162)
0.055
(0.061)
0.074
(0.059)
0.277⁎⁎⁎
(0.050)
0.005
(0.070)
0.080
(0.079)
0.172⁎⁎
(0.068)
Ln (TA)t − 1 0.006
(0.009)
0.006
(0.007)
0.007
(0.008)
0.003
(0.009)
0.004
(0.009)
0.005
(0.014)
0.009
(0.008)
0.001
(0.008)
0.002
(0.008)
0.008
(0.008)
0.004
(0.010)
0.004
(0.009)
Board sizet − 1 0.020⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.018⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.019⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.018⁎⁎⁎
(0.005)
0.027⁎⁎⁎
(0.005)
0.017⁎⁎
(0.008)
0.016⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.021⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.019⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.022⁎⁎⁎
(0.005)
0.018⁎⁎⁎
(0.005)
0.016⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
Fraction of independent
directorst − 1
0.159⁎⁎⁎
(0.054)
0.073
(0.048)
0.105⁎⁎
(0.048)
0.103⁎
(0.054)
0.046
(0.057)
0.069
(0.078)
0.062
(0.047)
0.165⁎⁎⁎
(0.053)
0.097⁎⁎
(0.048)
0.102
(0.133)
0.205⁎⁎⁎
(0.054)
0.051
(0.057)
CEO Chairmant − 1 0.017
(0.015)
0.035⁎⁎
(0.015)
– – 0.041⁎⁎
(0.019)
0.038
(0.025)
0.027⁎
(0.016)
0.026
(0.016)
0.030⁎⁎
(0.014)
0.027
(0.017)
0.015
(0.019)
0.026
(0.019)
CEO tenuret − 1 −0.002⁎
(0.001)
−0.002⁎⁎
(0.001)
−0.002⁎⁎
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.003⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.002)
−0.002⁎
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.004)
−0.003⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.001)
−0.003⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
E indext − 1 −0.016⁎
(0.010)
−0.021⁎⁎
(0.011)
−0.010
(0.006)
−0.012⁎
(0.007)
−0.008
(0.008)
0.008
(0.011)
−0.004
(0.006)
−0.018⁎⁎
(0.007)
−0.008
(0.006)
−0.011
(0.007)
−0.015⁎⁎
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.008)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6351 5699 7430 4620 6313 1593 6371 5679 5837 6213 3729 3932
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.141 0.132 0.121 0.054 0.135 0.135 0.136 0.097 0.154 0.103 0.156
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 8
Dividend initiation and re-initiation.
This table presents the Cox hazard regression results that predict the probability of dividend initiation and re-initiation following an omission, respectively. Fraction of
female directors is the number of female directors divided by board size. The other control variables are the same as in previous tables. Industry effects are constructed
based on the Fama-French 49-industry classiﬁcation. Statistical signiﬁcance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust ﬁrm-clustered standard errors reported in
brackets.
Initiation Re-initiation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of female dirst − 1 1.924⁎⁎
(0.968)
1.704⁎
(0.988)
8.227⁎
(4.945)
46.683⁎⁎⁎
(9.302)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3499 3499 275 213
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.051 0.271 0.503
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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appointment is an indicator variable that equals one for ﬁrms in the treatment group, and zero otherwise.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the DID results using both OLS (regression (1)) and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects (regression (2)). We in-
clude the same ﬁrm, governance and CEO controls as in regression (3) of Table 3. The coefﬁcient on Female appointment
× Post is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better in both regressions. This suggests that, after female director ap-
pointments, ﬁrms have higher levels of dividend payouts than after male director appointments. For instance, the coefﬁcient
in regression (2) suggests that, on average, ﬁrms' dividend payouts are 15.0 percentage points higher for the year after the
female director appointment than they are after the male director appointment.
One potential concern with the above analysis is that director appointments with changes in director types (i.e., replacing an
insider director with an independent director, or vice versa) capture a ﬁrm's strategic changes that might inﬂuence its dividend
payout. To mitigate this concern, we exclude director appointments with changes in director types before conducting the
matching. As a result, the number of matched pairs drops to 57, and our ﬁndings continue to hold.4. The role of corporate governance
In this section, we investigate whether the relationship between the fraction of female directors and the dividend payout
is affected by a ﬁrm's corporate governance quality and needs. If ﬁrms with female directors are more likely to use dividend
payouts as a governance device, then the positive effect of female directors on dividend payouts should be more prominent
if the ﬁrm's governance is weak and/or if its governance needs are high.
Table 7 presents the regressions on the dividend payout for the subsamples of ﬁrms with strong and weak governance as mea-
sured by the level of managerial entrenchment (E index), and CEO-chairman duality (CEO Chairman). It also splits ﬁrms according
to whether they operate in technology or non-technology industries. Again, for the latter we expect that the corporate governance
role of the board of directors is more important whereas for the former we expect that the advisory role of the board is more
important. We also expect insider directors of non-technology ﬁrms to be more entrenched than those of technology ﬁrms
(Anderson et al., 2000; Ittner et al., 2003). Hence, we expect the effect of female directors on the dividend payout to be greater
for non-technology ﬁrms than for technology ﬁrms. Regressions (1) and (2) present the results for the sample split into high and
low managerial entrenchment ﬁrms, respectively, based on the sample median of E index. The positive relationship between the
fraction of female directors and the dividend payout is statistically signiﬁcant only for the above-median E index ﬁrms where
managers are more likely to be entrenched. Regressions (3) and (4) present the results for the ﬁrms that combine the CEO
and chairman roles and those that separate them, respectively. The results show that the coefﬁcient on Fraction of female directors
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant only for the ﬁrms whose CEO is also the chairman of the board, consistent with the view
that the dividend monitoring device is more important when the CEO is more powerful. Regressions (5) and (6) present the re-
sults for non-technology ﬁrms and technology ﬁrms, respectively.19 As expected, the coefﬁcient on Fraction of female directors is
positive and highly signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) for the non-technology ﬁrms, but insigniﬁcant for the technology ﬁrms.19 The deﬁnitions of technology ﬁrms and non-technology ﬁrms are as in Anderson et al. (2000), Ittner et al. (2003), Murphy (2003), and Chemmanur et al. (2013).
Technologyﬁrms are deﬁned as companieswith primary SIC codes 3570 (Computer and Ofﬁce Equipment), 3571 (Electronic Computers), 3572 (Computer Storage De-
vices), 3576 (Computer Communication Equipment), 3577 (Computer Peripheral Equipment), 3661 (Telephone& TelegraphApparatus), 3674 (Semiconductor and Re-
lated Devices), 4812 (Wireless Telecommunication), 4813 (Telecommunication), 5045 (Computers and Software Wholesalers), 5961 (Electronic Mail-Order Houses),
7370 (Computer Programming, Data Processing), 7371 (Computer Programming Service), 7372 (Prepackaged Software), and 7373 (Computer Integrated Systems De-
sign). Non-technology ﬁrms are ﬁrms with SIC codes below 4000, not otherwise categorized as technology ﬁrms.
100 J. Chen et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 43 (2017) 86–105Regressions (7) and (8) show that the fraction of female directors has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on the dividend payout only for
ﬁrmswith above-median CEO tenure, reﬂecting the greater likelihood that the CEO is entrenched. In addition, high board independence
and product market competition are associated with better corporate governance and more effective monitoring of managerial actions
(Weisbach, 1988; Hart, 1983). Regressions (9) to (12) show that the relationship between the dividend payout and board gender com-
position is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (insigniﬁcant) for the subsample of ﬁrmswith low (high) governance quality asmeasured
by board independence and product market competition (i.e., the four-ﬁrm concentration ratio).20
To summarize, our results consistently suggest that the quality of a ﬁrm's governance as well as its needs for governance affect
the impact of female directors on dividend policy. The positive impact of board gender composition on dividend payouts is sig-
niﬁcant only for ﬁrms with weak governance as well as those with high governance needs, i.e., ﬁrms with high values for E
index, ﬁrms with CEO duality, ﬁrms with high CEO tenure, low board independence, and low product market competition as
well as non-technology ﬁrms. These ﬁndings lend further support to our hypothesis that female directors are more likely to
use high dividend payouts as a monitoring device than their male counterparts.
5. Dividend initiation and re-initiation
To the extent that dividends reduce agency costs of managerial expropriation and overinvestment (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984;
Jensen, 1986),we expect thatﬁrmswith female board representation aremore likely to initiate dividends. Accordingly, such ﬁrms should
also be more likely to reinitiate dividends following an omission. We test these hypotheses using the following regression.20 The
ﬁrm is i
21 The
databasPrðDividend Initiation=Re‐initiationÞ ¼ γ0 þ γ1  Fraction of female directorsi;t
þγ2Zi;t þ Industryi þ εi;t ð3ÞWe estimate the probability of dividend initiation or re-initiation using Fraction of female directors, as well as the same set of con-
trols as in Eq. (1) (i.e., Z), and industry effects. Following Ofﬁcer (2011), we deﬁne Dividend Initiation as the ﬁrst non-zero divi-
dend payment since the ﬁrm's ﬁrst appearance in the CRSP database.21 Firms that have initiated dividends before the ﬁrst year of
our sample period in 1997 are not included. As a result, the sample for this analysis consists of 691 ﬁrms (or 3499 ﬁrm-year ob-
servations), of which 166 have initiated a dividend payment over the period 1997–2011.
Similarly, we deﬁne Dividend Re-initiation as the ﬁrst non-zero dividend payment following an omission. To identify re-initia-
tions, we trace ﬁrms over the four years after an omission. Speciﬁcally, we restrict the re-initiation sample to ﬁrms that have (1)
complete information on dividend payments from year t − 1 to t + 4 with year t being the year of omission, (2) a non-zero
dividend payment in year t − 1, and (3) a zero dividend payment in year t. We end up with 61 ﬁrms that have omitted their
dividend, of which 24 have reinitiated within the four years after the omission, during the sample period.
We then estimate Eq. (3) using a Cox (1972) proportional hazard model, which ﬂexibly accommodates for the fact that each
ﬁrm's hazard rate, i.e., the probability that the ﬁrm initiates (re-initiates) dividend payments, is a function of the number of years
following the ﬁrst appearance in CRSP (a dividend omission) as well as the board gender diversity variable and the control var-
iables. Table 8 presents the results. For the sake of brevity, we only report coefﬁcient estimates for the gender diversity variable.
With and without the inclusion of the control variables, the coefﬁcient on Fraction of female directors is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% level or better, consistent with the prediction that ﬁrms with female board representation are more likely
to initiate dividends as well as reinitiate dividends after an omission.
6. Conclusion
Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984)were theﬁrst to suggest the corporate governance role of dividendswhereby dividendpayouts
are a means to mitigate Jensen's (1986) free cash ﬂow problem. Based on recent literature (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009), which sug-
gests that female independent directors increase the board'smonitoring intensity, we hypothesize that boardswith (more) female direc-
tors are more likely to use high dividend payouts as a corporate governance device. We ﬁnd evidence in favor of our hypothesis as the
fraction of female directors, more precisely the fraction of female independent directors, on the board is positively and signiﬁcantly re-
lated to various measures of dividend payout. This ﬁnding is robust to alternative econometric speciﬁcations, as well as alternative mea-
sures of female board representation. The identiﬁcation tests, using propensity scorematching, the instrumental variable approach and a
difference-in-differences analysis (DID), show that the results are not due to endogeneity issues.
Further analysis of the heterogeneity of the positive relationship between female directors and dividend payout suggests that the ef-
fect is signiﬁcant only in ﬁrms with weak governance and high governance needs. Finally, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with female directors are
more likely to initiate dividends as well as re-initiate dividends following an omission. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis
that female directors are more likely to use dividend payouts as a monitoring device than their male counterparts.four-ﬁrm concentration ratio is the fraction of a 5-digit NAICS industry's sales accounted for by its largest four ﬁrms and is a proxy for industry competition. A
ncluded in the high competition group if its four-ﬁrm concentration ratio is below the sample median, and vice versa.
results are qualitatively similar when we deﬁne dividend initiation as the ﬁrst non-zero dividend payment since the ﬁrm's ﬁrst appearance in the Compustat
e.
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Dividend payout measures
Dividend/NI Dividends over net income. Compustat
Dividend/TA Dividends over total assets. Compustat
Dividend yield Dividend per share divided by the ﬁscal year-end share price. Compustat
Dividend per share Dividend per share. Compustat
Dividend/Sales Dividends over total sales. Compustat
Measures of board gender diversity
Fraction of female dirs The number of female directors on the board divided by board size. RiskMetrics
Fraction of female indep. dirs The number of female independent directors divided by board size. RiskMetrics
Fraction of male indep. dirs The number of male independent directors divided by board size. RiskMetrics
Fraction of female insider dirs The number of female insider directors divided by board size. RiskMetrics
Fraction of female dirs_tw The weighted fraction of female directors with the weights being the tenure of each female director
relative to the total board tenure.
RiskMetrics
Control variables
Leverage The sum of short- and long-term debts divided by total assets. Compustat
R&D/Sales R&D expenditure divided by total sales. Compustat
Tobin's q Market value of equity (the product of ﬁscal year-end closing stock price and number of shares
outstanding) plus total assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by total assets.
Compustat
ROA Return on assets, computed as the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
divided by total assets.
Compustat
Return volatility Time-series standard deviation of ROA over the past ﬁve years. Compustat
Cash/net assets Cash and marketable securities divided by net assets. Net assets are computed as total assets minus
cash and marketable securities.
Compustat
PPE/TA Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Compustat
Ln (TA) Log of total assets in constant 2009 dollars (based on US GDP deﬂator from the Federal Reserve
Economic Data).
Compustat
Board size The total number of directors on the board. RiskMetrics
Board independence The number of independent directors divided by board size. RiskMetrics
Board age The average director age on the board. RiskMetrics
Age diversity The standard deviation of director age divided by the average director age on the board. RiskMetrics
Board tenure The average director tenure on the board. RiskMetrics
Tenure diversity The standard deviation of director tenure divided by the average director age on the board. RiskMetrics
CEO Chairman An indicator variable, which takes the value of one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and
zero otherwise.
ExecuComp
CEO tenure The number of years the CEO has been in position. ExecuComp
E index An index, deﬁned by Bebchuk et al. (2009), and based on six antitakeover provisions. The six
provisions include: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills,
golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. The
index counts the number of antitakeover provision in place.
Bebchuk et al. (2009)
& RiskMetrics
CEO ownership The percentage stock ownership of the CEO. ExecuComp
Ln(1 + CEO Delta) The natural logarithm of one plus CEO Delta, deﬁned as dollar change in wealth associated with a
1% change in the ﬁrm's stock price (in $000s).
Coles et al. (2006)
Ln(1 + CEO Vega) The natural logarithm of one plus CEO Vega, deﬁned as dollar change in wealth associated with a
0.01 change in the standard deviation of the ﬁrm's returns (in $000s).
Coles et al. (2006)
Four-Firm Concentration Ratio The fraction of a 5-digit NAICS industry's sales accounted for by its largest four ﬁrms. US Economic
Consensus
Total number of external board
seats by directors
Total number of external board seats held by all directors on the ﬁrm's board. RiskMetrics
Total number of male external
board seats
Total number of external board seats held by male directors on the ﬁrm's board. RiskMetrics
Instruments
Fraction of male directors
linked to female directors
The fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards with at least one female
director, following Adams and Ferreira (2009).
RiskMetrics
Female-to-male participation
ratio
The female participation ratio divided by the male participation ratio for the state where the ﬁrm is
headquartered. The female (male) participation ratio is measured as the percentage of the civilian
non-institutional population of the female (male) group in the civilian labor force.
US Census Bureau
Appendix B. Correlation matrix
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11
Dividend/TA V1 1.00
DPS/Share price V2 0.63⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Dividend per share (DPS) V3 0.66⁎⁎⁎ 0.78⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Dividend/NI V4 0.49⁎⁎⁎ 0.54⁎⁎⁎ 0.52⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Dividend/Sales V5 0.82⁎⁎⁎ 0.68⁎⁎⁎ 0.73⁎⁎⁎ 0.52⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Fraction of female dirs V6 0.16⁎⁎⁎ 0.21⁎⁎⁎ 0.26⁎⁎⁎ 0.13⁎⁎⁎ 0.19⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Fraction of female indep. dirs V7 0.15⁎⁎⁎ 0.21⁎⁎⁎ 0.27⁎⁎⁎ 0.13⁎⁎⁎ 0.19⁎⁎⁎ 0.92⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Fraction of female execu. dirs V8 0.036⁎⁎⁎ 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02⁎ 0.28⁎⁎⁎ −0.01 1.00
Fraction of male indep. dirs V9 −0.01 0.03⁎⁎⁎ 0.07⁎⁎⁎ 0.02⁎ 0.03⁎⁎⁎ −0.27⁎⁎⁎ −0.20⁎⁎⁎ −0.13⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Leverage V10 −0.02⁎ 0.22⁎⁎⁎ 0.20⁎⁎⁎ 0.11⁎⁎⁎ 0.12⁎⁎⁎ 0.13⁎⁎⁎ 0.14⁎⁎⁎ −0.04⁎⁎⁎ −0.01 1.00
R&D/Sales V11 −0.07⁎⁎⁎ −0.11⁎⁎⁎ −0.11⁎⁎⁎ −0.07⁎⁎⁎ −0.06⁎⁎⁎ −0.07⁎⁎⁎ −0.06⁎⁎⁎ −0.02⁎ 0.03⁎⁎⁎ −0.10⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Tobin's q V12 0.19⁎⁎⁎ −0.19⁎⁎⁎ −0.11⁎⁎⁎ −0.07⁎⁎⁎ 0.07⁎⁎⁎ −0.02⁎⁎⁎ −0.03⁎⁎⁎ 0.03⁎⁎⁎ −0.09⁎⁎⁎ −0.32⁎⁎⁎ 0.15⁎⁎⁎
ROA V13 0.29⁎⁎⁎ −0.01 0.07⁎⁎⁎ 0.02⁎ 0.15⁎⁎⁎ 0.06⁎⁎⁎ 0.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.04⁎⁎⁎ −0.08⁎⁎⁎ −0.17⁎⁎⁎ −0.31⁎⁎⁎
Return volatility V14 −0.09⁎⁎⁎ −0.20⁎⁎⁎ −0.23⁎⁎⁎ −0.15⁎⁎⁎ −0.16⁎⁎⁎ −0.16⁎⁎⁎ −0.17⁎⁎⁎ 0.01 0.04⁎⁎⁎ −0.17⁎⁎⁎ 0.26⁎⁎⁎
Cash/net assets V15 −0.04⁎⁎⁎ −0.15⁎⁎⁎ −0.16⁎⁎⁎ −0.08⁎⁎⁎ −0.06⁎⁎⁎ −0.10⁎⁎⁎ −0.11⁎⁎⁎ 0.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.04⁎⁎⁎ −0.30⁎⁎⁎ 0.36⁎⁎⁎
PPE/TA V16 0.05⁎⁎⁎ 0.23⁎⁎⁎ 0.24⁎⁎⁎ 0.15⁎⁎⁎ 0.20⁎⁎⁎ 0.05⁎⁎⁎ 0.05⁎⁎⁎ −0.03⁎⁎⁎ −0.02⁎ 0.32⁎⁎⁎ −0.14⁎⁎⁎
TA ($m) V17 0.16⁎⁎⁎ 0.24⁎⁎⁎ 0.41⁎⁎⁎ 0.16⁎⁎⁎ 0.32⁎⁎⁎ 0.24⁎⁎⁎ 0.26⁎⁎⁎ −0.03⁎⁎⁎ 0.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.16⁎⁎⁎ −0.04⁎⁎⁎
Board size V18 0.21⁎⁎⁎ 0.31⁎⁎⁎ 0.40⁎⁎⁎ 0.21⁎⁎⁎ 0.28⁎⁎⁎ 0.31⁎⁎⁎ 0.31⁎⁎⁎ 0.00 −0.05⁎⁎⁎ 0.28⁎⁎⁎ −0.09⁎⁎⁎
Fraction of independent dirs V19 0.08⁎⁎⁎ 0.15⁎⁎⁎ 0.22⁎⁎⁎ 0.09⁎⁎⁎ 0.13⁎⁎⁎ 0.25⁎⁎⁎ 0.35⁎⁎⁎ −0.13⁎⁎⁎ 0.85⁎⁎⁎ 0.07⁎⁎⁎ −0.01
CEO Chairman V20 0.07⁎⁎⁎ 0.12⁎⁎⁎ 0.19⁎⁎⁎ 0.08⁎⁎⁎ 0.10⁎⁎⁎ 0.10⁎⁎⁎ 0.12⁎⁎⁎ −0.03⁎⁎⁎ 0.02⁎ 0.10⁎⁎⁎ −0.06⁎⁎⁎
CEO tenure V21 −0.05⁎⁎⁎ −0.09⁎⁎⁎ −0.11⁎⁎⁎ −0.07⁎⁎⁎ −0.08⁎⁎⁎ −0.15⁎⁎⁎ −0.17⁎⁎⁎ 0.02⁎⁎⁎ −0.06⁎⁎⁎ −0.09⁎⁎⁎ 0.00
E index V22 −0.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.06⁎⁎⁎ 0.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.02⁎⁎ −0.02⁎⁎ 0.09⁎⁎⁎ 0.13⁎⁎⁎ −0.08⁎⁎⁎ 0.17⁎⁎⁎ 0.11⁎⁎⁎ −0.04⁎⁎⁎
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22
Dividend/TA V1
DPS/Share price V2
Dividend per share (DPS) V3
Dividend/NI V4
Dividend/Sales V5
Fraction of female dirs V6
Fraction of female indep. dirs V7
Fraction of female execu. dirs V8
Fraction of male indep. dirs V9
Leverage V10
R&D/Sales V11
Tobin's q V12 1.00
ROA V13 0.45⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Return volatility V14 0.17⁎⁎⁎ −0.14⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Cash/net assets V15 0.28⁎⁎⁎ −0.12⁎⁎⁎ 0.27⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
PPE/TA V16 −0.22⁎⁎⁎ 0.08⁎⁎⁎ −0.11⁎⁎⁎ −0.30⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
TA ($m) V17 −0.07⁎⁎⁎ −0.01 −0.12⁎⁎⁎ −0.11⁎⁎⁎ 0.12⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Board size V18 −0.12⁎⁎⁎ 0.02⁎ −0.24⁎⁎⁎ −0.25⁎⁎⁎ 0.18⁎⁎⁎ 0.45⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Fraction of independent dirs V19 −0.10⁎⁎⁎ −0.05⁎⁎⁎ −0.06⁎⁎⁎ −0.02⁎ 0.01 0.18⁎⁎⁎ 0.12⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
CEO Chairman V20 −0.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.02⁎⁎ −0.09⁎⁎⁎ −0.09⁎⁎⁎ 0.10⁎⁎⁎ 0.14⁎⁎⁎ 0.13⁎⁎⁎ 0.08⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
CEO tenure V21 0.03⁎⁎⁎ 0.02⁎⁎ 0.01 0.07⁎⁎⁎ −0.05⁎⁎⁎ −0.09⁎⁎⁎ −0.14⁎⁎⁎ −0.15⁎⁎⁎ 0.23⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
E index V22 −0.15⁎⁎⁎ −0.07⁎⁎⁎ −0.10⁎⁎⁎ −0.10⁎⁎⁎ 0.05⁎⁎⁎ −0.07⁎⁎⁎ 0.12⁎⁎⁎ 0.23⁎⁎⁎ 0.05⁎⁎⁎ −0.10⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Appendix B. (continued)
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This table contains a number of checks testing the robustness of the relationship between board gender composition and the dividend payout
to alternative econometric estimation techniques, subsamples, and dividend variables. The alternative estimation techniques include OLS, Tobit,
and Fama-MacBeth regressions basedon the baselinemodel speciﬁcation. Firm-clustered standard errors are used in theOLS andTobit regressions
and Newey-West robust standard errors are used in the Fama-MacBeth regressions. We check the robustness of our results when using subsam-
ples excluding telecommunication and utilities ﬁrms, ﬁrmswith female CEOs, and ﬁrmswith female chairman CEOs.We test for possible non-lin-
ear effects of board gender composition on the dividend payout by including the squared term of board gender composition in the baseline OLS
regressions.We also check the robustness of our results to controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity and to alternative dimensions of board
diversity, including director age and tenure diversity. For each robustness check, we estimate the regressions separately for each of the ﬁve mea-
sures of dividend payments: the dividend payout, dividends to total assets, dividend yield, dividend per share and dividends to total sales. The
same set of control variables, industry and year effects as in our baseline regressions are included. For brevity, we only report the coefﬁcients
on the Fraction of female dirs.Dividend/NI Dividend/TA Dividend yield Dividends per share Dividend/Sales
OLS regressions (N = 12,050)
Fraction of female dirst − 1 0.167⁎⁎
(0.069)
0.011⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.013⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.370⁎⁎⁎
(0.105)
0.009⁎⁎
(0.005)
Tobit regressions (N = 12,050)
Fraction of female dirst − 1 0.474⁎⁎⁎
(0.131)
0.024⁎⁎⁎
(0.006)
0.024⁎⁎⁎
(0.005)
0.714⁎⁎⁎
(0.165)
0.023⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
Fama MacBeth regressions (N = 12,050)
Fraction of female dirst − 1 0.234⁎⁎
(0.079)
0.014⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.014⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.434⁎⁎⁎
(0.102)
0.012⁎⁎
(0.004)
Excluding telecom and utilities (N = 10,867)
Fraction of female dirst − 1 0.123⁎⁎
(0.062)
0.011⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.011⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.366⁎⁎⁎
(0.106)
0.009⁎
(0.005)
Excluding observations with female CEOs (N = 11,793)
Fraction of female dirst − 1 0.148⁎⁎
(0.065)
0.010⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.011⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.363⁎⁎⁎
(0.107)
0.009⁎
(0.005)
Excluding observations with female chairman CEOs (N = 11,912)
Fraction of female dirst − 1 0.132⁎⁎
(0.064)
0.009⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.011⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.351⁎⁎⁎
(0.104)
0.009⁎
(0.005)
Non-linearity (N = 12,050)
Fraction of female dirst − 1 0.343⁎⁎
(0.151)
0.018⁎⁎
(0.009)
0.023⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
0.791⁎⁎⁎
(0.207)
0.018⁎
(0.010)
Squared fraction of female dirst − 1 −0.619
(0.531)
−0.025
(0.029)
−0.037
(0.023)
−1.483⁎⁎
(0.628)
−0.013
(0.031)
Controlling for ln(1 + CEO Delta) and ln(1 + CEO Vega)
Fraction of female dirst − 1 0.142⁎
(0.073)
0.010⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.011⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.335⁎⁎⁎
(0.104)
0.009⁎
(0.005)Controlling for Board age, Age diversity, Board tenure and Tenure diversity
Fraction of female dirst − 1 0.144⁎⁎ 0.012⁎⁎⁎ 0.012⁎⁎⁎ 0.290⁎⁎⁎ 0.006(0.066) (0.004) (0.003) (0.109) (0.005)Appendix D. IV regressions with additional controls
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level. ⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level. ⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.Dependent variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
Fraction of female dirs. Dividend/NI Fraction of female dirs. Dividend/NI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept −0.096⁎⁎⁎
(0.035)
0.382
(0.235)
−0.158⁎⁎⁎
(0.034)
0.357⁎
(0.215)
Fraction of male directors linked to female dirst − 1 0.056⁎⁎⁎
(0.011)
– 0.110⁎⁎⁎
(0.010)
–
Fraction of female dirst – 1 – 1.953⁎⁎⁎
(0.707)
– 1.147⁎⁎⁎
(0.335)
Total external board seatst − 1 −0.001⁎⁎
(0.000)
0.001
(0.001)
– –
Male external board seatst − 1 – – −0.005⁎⁎⁎
(0.000)
0.004⁎⁎
(0.002)
Leveraget − 1 0.003
(0.011)
−0.094⁎⁎
(0.047)
0.004
(0.011)
−0.093⁎⁎
(0.044)
R&D/Salest − 1 −0.005
(0.004)
−0.011
(0.026)
−0.005
(0.005)
−0.015
(0.026)
Tobin's qt − 1 0.001
(0.001)
−0.004
(0.005)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.004
(0.004)
ROAt − 1 0.021
(0.020)
0.079
(0.076)
0.014
(0.019)
0.103
(0.067)
(continued)
Dependent variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
Fraction of female dirs. Dividend/NI Fraction of female dirs. Dividend/NI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash/net assetst − 1 0.004
(0.003)
0.022
(0.015)
0.005
(0.003)
0.025⁎
(0.015)
PPE/TAt − 1 −0.006
(0.012)
0.078
(0.048)
−0.009
(0.011)
0.075
(0.046)
Return volatilityt − 1 −0.055
(0.040)
−0.568⁎⁎⁎
(0.157)
−0.044
(0.038)
−0.620⁎⁎⁎
(0.140)
Ln (TA)t − 1 0.008⁎⁎⁎
(0.002)
−0.016⁎
(0.010)
0.010⁎⁎⁎
(0.002)
−0.012
(0.008)
Board sizet − 1 0.006⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
0.008
(0.005)
0.009⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
0.011⁎⁎
(0.004)
Fraction of independent directorst − 1 0.074⁎⁎⁎
(0.012)
−0.055
(0.073)
0.081⁎⁎⁎
(0.011)
−0.002
(0.051)
CEO Chairmant − 1 0.011⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.003
(0.016)
0.010⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.012
(0.013)
CEO tenuret − 1 −0.001⁎⁎⁎
(0.000)
0.000
(0.001)
−0.001⁎⁎⁎
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.001)
E indext − 1 0.002
(0.001)
−0.014⁎⁎
(0.006)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.012⁎⁎
(0.005)
Industry effects Y Y Y Y
Year effects Y Y Y Y
N 11,860 11,860 11,860 11,860
Adjusted R2 0.289 0.042 0.321 0.108
F-statistic 28.500⁎⁎⁎ – 122.350⁎⁎⁎ –
Obs. 11,860 – 11,860 –
CD Wald F-statistic 133.570 – 532.060 –
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level. ⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level. ⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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